GDP per head is not only an economic indicator, but is widely used as a welfare indicator. This use not well founded in economic theory. The paper compares income per head with a three groups of alternative indicators: 'extended national accounts', social indicators, and indicators of subjective well-being. All of these methods indicate a decline in the welfare productivity of GDP goods over time.
Britain, the 'pessimists' in the 'standard of living' debate argued that material improvement was compatible with a decline in well-being. In the United States, the debate on the economics of slavery suggested that efficiency was compatible with human degradation.
The debate on economic growth is usually regarded as an expression of conflicting values. But it might also be the case that the sources of human welfare are historically contingent. As the two decades of the postwar age (c. 1950-1970) came to an end, attention began to shift towards the costs of affluence, ecological, social and psychic. In the poorest of countries, priority was claimed for a set of basic needs over the sacrifices necessary for maximising GDP. Hence, from the late 1960s onwards, the quest for alternatives to GDP as measures of welfare.
'Alternative' measurements of welfare have followed three approaches. The first involved 'extending' the national accounts, to incorporate non-market goods and services, and to eliminate detrimental components. A second approach identified social norms, and evaluated their provision by means of 'social indicators'. A third approach has targeted mental states directly, by means of survey data on reported subjective well-being, and by research on the dynamics of hedonic experience. Cumulatively, these three approaches suggest that the pursuit of welfare is not always satisfied by economic growth alone, and may require different measures at different times.
Extended Accounts
The micro-economic foundations of the SNA are insecure. The obstacles to the measurement of economic welfare at the micro level are formidable. Much of the difficulty arises from the problem of disaggregation from market prices and quantities to household and to individual consumption. 5 Aggregating welfare upwards from individuals and households to the level of society is even less tractable. As Amartya Sen puts it, 'personal real income theory translates readily into the theory of real national income [only] if the nation is viewed as a person.' 6 This 'welfarist' position, he says, is 'not outrageously realistic.' Since the nation is not a single 5 Slesnick, "Empirical Approaches".
output. On the positive side, Nordhaus and Tobin imputed values for household production, and for time available for leisure.
Extended accounting of this and similar kinds has continued into the 1980s and the 1990s, and has included estimates for the United States, Britain, Europe and Australia.
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Some of these contained retrospective historical accounts, going back to 1950 for Britain, 1869 for the United States, and all the way to 1788 for Australia. 13 These indices indicate that extended welfare has been positively correlated with GNP over the long run, though the actual growth rates have differed.
14 The most compelling implication is that more welfare is derived from non-market than from market activities. Typically the imputed value of leisure equals or exceeds the value of GDP, and household production adds another 25 to 45 percent. About two thirds of output arise outside the market. This salience of non-commodities casts doubt on the welfarist assumption that all well-being can be priced. Leisure and housework dominate the index, and are relatively undifferentiated and slow to change. Hence, the summary indicators are not much use for monitoring cyclical fluctuations. They do satisfy feminist demands for the validation of housework, and in the medium term, provide evidence about trends in nonmarket activities. Together with the rise of the service sector (also poorly estimated in the national accounts), the emergence of extended accounts may be regarded as acknowledging the secular shift of welfare away from its prior association with material production.
Extended accounting relies heavily on the allocation of time. There is also a strand of research which takes time-use as the measure of welfare. This lends itself both to micro and to macro applications. 15 Gershuny and colleagues are attempting to devise an encompassing 11 Nordhaus and Tobin, "Is Growth Obsolete?" 12 Kendrick, "Studies"; Zolotas, Economic Growth; Eisner, Total Incomes; Nordhaus, "Reflections";
Beckerman, "Comparable Growth"; Crafts, "Thatcher Experiment"; Snooks, Portrait. 13 Crafts, "Thatcher Experiment"; Eisner, Total Incomes; Sametz, "Measurement"; Snooks, Portrait.
14 Nordhaus, "Reflections". lag between impulse and execution, and by the time social indicators were delivered, the impetus of social democracy was spent. Priorities for social expenditure had already been set in the 'golden age' period of expansion and the 1970s were a period of fiscal retrenchment.
Social consensus swung away from equality and towards competition, from the left towards the right. The absence of a coherent accounting framework was another disadvantage.
In developing countries, deprivation was not relative but absolute. In the 1970s a 'basic needs' movement identified a bundle of goods that might claim priority over economic growth. 37 Economic historians adopted the same principle by taking anthropometric measures, primarily heights, as a welfare index.
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What followed shows how social indicators not only depend on norms, but can also help to create them. The focus on basic needs came into conflict in the 1980s with the World Bank/IMF 'structural adjustment' policy, and with the increasing market orientation within development economics. The results of these programmes have been mixed, but the impression was that costs fell often disproportionately on the poor. In the late 1980s, dissatisfaction with the 'structural adjustment' programme inspired the creation of a new social indicator, the Human Development Index [HDI] . 40 This is made up of income per head, life expectation at birth, and an education indicator, expressed in a single figure between 0 and 1. It has gained wide acceptance, and may have played some role in the partial retreat of the World Bank, and its acknowledgment of poverty as a policy objective. 41 Morris's updated index of 1996, which covered a longer time-span, also exposed the ambiguity of the links between growth and welfare. 42 Like the SNA, the development indices are another case where a concept has achieved the cognitive punch required for an impact in policy and political discourse.
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It is interesting to compare HDI and GNP with Sen's 'capabilities' approach, which has attracted a great deal of discussion. Sen moved from an axiomatic 'welfarist' position to the view that income alone does not satisfactorily capture welfare. In keeping with Liberal values, he has not privileged any particular good. Even under indigence it was necessary to respect individual priorities. 44 Well-being constitutes having the 'capabilities' to achieve valuable 'functionings'. Both of these categories extend beyond the purely economic. Sen has not embodied his approach in any metrics (it has influenced the Human Development Index), 39 Floud et al., Nutritional Status; Fogel, "Economic Growth". 40 Desai, "Human Development". The most compelling justification for the SNA as a measure of welfare is its correlation with social indicators which enjoy normative consensus as "good things". Hence, it is instructive to test the claims that this correlation exists. What such tests indicate, is that the correlation is strong under conditions of indigence, but loses its power at surprisingly low levels of real income. In figure 2, three such indicators are plotted against income per head.
These are Morris's Physical Quality of Life Index (3 indicators), Estes' Index of Social
Progress (36 indicators in 10 subgroups), and Slottje's Multidimensional Quality of Life Index. 45 All three suggest a strong diminution of welfare returns to income at around $2,500-3,000 US in 1981 prices. The HDI already incorporates such a turning point in its premises, by including income per head in its arguments, with a diminishing return to incomes higher than the whole-sample average.
A visual examination of the figures indicates that some countries achieve very high levels of welfare indicators on very low incomes, and that others persist in low welfare indicators on high incomes. These three exercises in social indicators research confirm the extended accounts findings of a curvilinear relation between income and welfare.
A logarithmic curve provides the best fit. These indices are cross-sections at one point in time. Similar patterns also appear to obtain over the long term. (1960, 1970, 1980 and 1990) , in seven domains. 49 All of these indicators were regressed on income per head, with fixed time effects. The criterion for robustness was that an indicator had an impact on the quality of life that was significant, positive and more important than exogenous shifts. Exogenous shifts capture not the effect of local income, but of global socio-economic progress which may arise from the diffusion of knowledge or of norms. Three methods were used. In the first, all data were pooled, and only time effects were included in the regression. 32 out of 81 indicators passed this test. When country fixed effects were added, the number of robust indicators fell to 10. With a firstdifferences IV estimator to establish causal effects, only 6 indicators survived out of 69.
Three variables alone passed all three tests: calories per head, protein per head, and telephones per head. The first two, however, are known to have problematic effects on wellbeing once adequacy has been reached. 50 This, the most extensive social-indicator test so far, has confirmed that the relation of well-being and income per head is weak, both in cross section and over time.
Association between health outcomes and economic status has long been observed internally within countries. 51 It is not entirely clear how much ill-being arises simply from material deprivation, and how much from the psychic costs of exclusion. There are good descriptive indicators of inequality, such as the Poverty Line, Lorenz Curve, the Gini 48 Easterly, "Life during Growth". 49 (1) rights and democracy (2) political stability and war (3) education (4) health (5) transport and communication (6) inequality and (7) "bads". 50 Offer, "Epidemics of Abundance". The HDI has the prestige of UN approval, is widely used and quoted, and has also been used retrospectively, for historical evaluation. 53 The United Nations has now also laid down a standard for a fifteen-item 'minimum national social data set'. 54 But unlike HDI or PQLI, the components do not lend themselves to aggregation, indexation, or a focal-point summary figure. These indicators are all oriented towards development. They are essentially catch-up indices, calibrated to current best practice. They fail to address the original impulse of the social indicators movement, which was finding a way of measuring welfare in affluent societies; not only the welfare of the poor in those societies, but also of those who are working, healthy, and reasonably well-off. How does economic growth affect such people, and is it worth the cost?
Psychological Indicators
Economic resources are not final goods, but intermediate ones. curvilinear form, flattening out at about $6, 000-8,000 (1971-1975) . 66 Interestingly, a rise of income over time for particular individuals produced no improvement at all in well-being.
Among the determinants of SWB, the quality of relationships, of leisure, and of work experience counted a considerably more for aggregate well-being than income and consumption measures. 67 Materialism, a preoccupation with economic well-being, was negatively correlated with SWB, and especially so in those who believe that more money would make one happier.
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The determinants of SWB have more recently been investigated on very large samples over time, in both the United States and in Europe. 69 The findings are consistent with previous ones. They show little variation over time. Absolute income counts for little but relative income (i.e. position in the ladder of earnings) has significant influence on wellbeing, from the second quartile upwards. Misery, i.e. strong negative divergences from the the reference case (white, married, female, employed), is caused primarily by three conditions:
non-white race, unemployment, and non-marriage. There are also a number of consistent but weaker effects, such as age (U-shaped). Gender makes no difference. In the European sample there are also very strong country effects. The magnitude of the coefficients is remarkably similar from one large sample to another, which indicates that however crude SWB is as a measure of well-being, it is rather robustly explained. The positive cross-sectional correlation of income and SWB within countries has long suggested a link from static to dynamic approaches, and to the 'relative income hypothesis', which states that what counts is not absolute income, but relativities. 70 From this point of view, if distribution is unchanged, then even a large rise in income will leave no impact on well-being. For example, the large rise in American, French and Japanese incomes since the war has hardly changed their SWB scores ( fig. 3b) . The reason for this, it is argued, is that as incomes increase, so do consumption norms. 71 Consumers become habituated to new levels of consumption. Quite independently, Scitovsky reviewed psychological research on arousal 69 Di Tella et al, "Macroeconomics of Happiness"; Blanchflower and Oswald, "Well-Being". 70 Duesenberry, Consumer Behavior; Hirsch, Limits to Growth. 71 Easterlin, "Raising the Incomes". and habituation to probe the dynamics of diminishing returns. 72 He also drew some normative implications for economic priorities, and questioned whether American acquisitiveness was in fact increasing welfare. The 'Leyden Approach' to welfare research has also found that the individual welfare returns to income follow a curvilinear trajectory, and that the welfare increment declines substantially as income increases. Earning norms drift up with income, though not all the way. A more vivid metaphor, which applies to all three measurement approaches to welfare, is the 'hedonic treadmill': income has to rise in order to sustain satisfaction at a constant level.
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The World Values Survey permits a cross-sectional test of the importance of the effect on subjective well-being of relative and absolute income. Figure 3 incidates that in the cross-section absolute income is quite highly correlated with subjective well-being scores.
But the same dataset also makes it possible to distinguish whether it is relative or absolute income that produces well-being. Relative income is estimated as the proportion of those who say they are 'very happy' at 'lower', moderate and 'higher' incomes. A regression analysis finds that for the 35 countries included, relative income is significant, and absolute income is not (table 3) . The low responsiveness of well-being to income under affluence may arise because people are simply born happy or unhappy, and most are happy already. Longitudinal studies indicate that personality is a strong predictor of SWB. 74 One review concludes that happiness is more a trait than a state. 75 A study of separated identical twins suggests that neither social and economic status, educational attainment, family income, marital status or religious commitment could account for more than three percent of the variance in 'happiness'. About half the variance was associated with genetic variation. Subsequent re-testing suggested that about 80 percent of the stable element in well-being was heritable.
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Culture provides another element of stability. Affluent industrial societies with similar levels of income per head report very different levels of subjective well-being, with a gradient coming down from the Nordic countries, which have very high levels, the Englishspeaking countries at an intermediate level, The Catholic middle and south of Europe lower still, and Japan lowest of all. 77 Inglehart regards this gradient as a representing an adaptation or adjustment to affluence. He classifies societies on two value orientation dimensions, the pursuit of economic security and deference to traditional authority. As societies become more affluent, they move gradually away from both. This implies that the experience of affluence reduces concerns about economic security, and that culture adapts, albeit slowly, to changes in economic endowment.
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In affluent societies, culture appears to affect SWB more strongly than income. Japan There is a large programme of empirical research into the determinants of choice, which queries the empirical validity of the axioms of rationality. This is not very damaging to SNA welfare measures, since, as we have seen, their micro-foundations are already insecure.
These lines of research have not so far provided direct measures of the validity of welfare aggregation, but rather implicitly query the premises of consumer sovereignty. This effort has highlighted a sequence of systematic and recurrent deviations from normative optimising choice behaviour. 86 The most robust ones appear to be asymmetric valuation of gains and losses, and the 'endowment effect' by which goods acquire a value once they have entered into possession. If correct, these findings cast further doubt on the possibility of compensating losers, and on the notion of 'opportunity cost'. Research in the hedonics of satisfaction continues. It stresses that satisfaction depends on habituation, anchoring, contrast and temporal effects; that the experience of satisfaction varies with time, and changes between decision, experience and retrospection. 87 83 Sen, "Income Comparisons". 84 Rowntree, Poverty, ch. 5. 85 Hagenaars et al., "Patterns of Poverty", p.26. 86 Rabin, "Psychology". 87 Kahneman, "Objective Happiness", 14-21.
Under affluence SWB appears buoyant and quite stable, and responds quite sluggishly to economic indicators, both stagnation and growth. It is poorly correlated with income in affluent societies, and highly correlated in poor countries, confirming the diminishing returns to income detected in social indicators research. 88 Both extended accounting and static psychological indicators suggest that well-being is derived to a great extent outside the market, from human relations in the workplace, the family, and from other forms of attachment. The psychic payoff of rising absolute income is small, but gains in relative income are rewarding. There are high levels of satisfaction with stable attributes which cannot easily be changed, such as personality, gender, and nationality. Stability and habituation appears to promote well-being.
This also suggests that novelty may undermine it. New rewards are compelling, while their costs are not yet known. Economic competition is driven by novelty and innovation, which stimulate myopic rather than informed choices. In the absence of prior experience, new forms of stimulation are highly compelling. Innovation devalues existing prudential conventions and norms, and is to that extent destructive of existing psychic and social capital.
Diener found that SWB is inversely related to the pace of economic growth. 89 Cheap alcohol, drugs, tobacco, fast food, are all innovations which it has taken society decades to adjust and to cope with.
Conclusion
'Alternative' measures of welfare provide a great variety of indicators, in cross-section and over time, international, intra-national, and individual. A common pattern emerges: the relation of economic welfare and welfare overall is historically contingent. They all suggest a curvilinear relationship between economic welfare and human welfare. Using extended accounting and social indicators, international comparisons suggest an historical cycle of two periods. In the first, economic growth provides high welfare payoffs, as basic deprivations are remedied and basic needs are satisfied. In the second phase, GDP goods provide diminishing, 88 Veenhoven, "Satisfaction Research", p. 25. steady or even negative returns, depending on the measure used. This pattern can be fitted either to logistic or to power curves. A logistic curve model was first proposed by Xenophon Zolotas in 1981. He described three phases of in the relation of income and welfare, of privation, steady improvements and declining ones, respectively. 90 More graphic metaphors might be the economy of deprivation and the economy of satiation; or the economy of pain followed by the economy of pleasure. For social indicators the logarithmic curve relation of welfare to income may be more appropriate. The three studies presented in figure 2 , as well as the HDI, all have in common the initial steep rise, followed by an increasingly flat trajectory.
Subjective individual welfare also follows a similar log-normal or power curve response to economic welfare. 91 The cross-sectional international comparative relation of subjective well-being with income is positive, linear and fairly weak; it disappears when controlled for relative income. The temporal relation for individual countries is almost completely flat. This is consistent with low psychic welfare returns to rising economic growth, the classic 'hedonic treadmill'.
If it is true that GDP goods and services have delivered and are delivering diminishing welfare returns, the question is why. It is premature to attempt to answer it here, but a few observations might be ventured. Both ecological and psychological approaches have one notion in common, namely that affluence produces congestion. In both cases, the affluent economy produces more than it can absorb. The ecology cannot absorb the extra energy, the extra traffic, the extra pollution, without incurring costs that equal or exceed the benefits.
Likewise, the abundance of psychic reward under affluence leads to satiation and habituation.
These are simple-minded metaphors that require much greater analysis and empirical study.
But policy cannot wait. Alternative accounting of welfare is pragmatically motivated, and even at this stage, it has some implications for policy. (a) In the most advanced economies, the increased supply of GDP goods and services is not the highest priority. This 89 Diener et al, "Income and Subjective Well-Being"; "Predicting Subjective Well-Being". 90 Zolotas, Economic Growth, fig. 1 , p. 16.
may already be reflected in the shift of policy priorities away from the golden-age preoccupation with growth, to the pursuit of macro-economic stability in the period that followed. It does not follow that this shift was welfare-improving overall, since it was accompanied by a rising inequality and unemployment. (b) For policy to find a coherent focus, it requires a better understanding of hedonic dynamics. High levels of well-being are already pervasive, and it is evidently difficult to improve them much further by raising incomes overall. What is needed is a more systematic targeting of ill-being, its determinants, and the economic costs of its amelioration, to make the reduction of ill-being the focus of international competition: of such things as life expectation, material deprivation, the prevalence of crime and the severity of punishment, ethnic, social and political exclusion and repression, family structure and breakdown, mental health, suicide, morbidity, education, quality of working life, job security, access to health care, urban congestion and sprawl, and perhaps also of the quality of personal and social interaction. 92 It might be more useful to shift the focus of measurement from happiness to unhappiness. There is a view that ill-being does not belong on the same dimension as well-being. 93 'Prospect theory' argues that losses are more acutely experienced than gains. Unemployment and discrimination have a much more powerful effect on well-being than material gains. 94 It may be easier to reach consensus about welfare bads than about welfare goods.
This does not mean that GNP goods have lost their relevance permanently. A society dependent on exponential growth for a stable experience of well-being might suffer badly if growth is withdrawn. Many societies have yet to arrive at that state of abundance, and can still anticipate large welfare returns to growth. And a shift away from GDP goods towards leisure or short-term gratification might eventually return us to the economy of pain. Longer life expectation, high dependency rates and shorter working lives suggest that material 91 Kahneman, "Objective Happiness", p. 17; van Praag and Frijters,"Measurement", p. 419-420. 92 Doyal and Gough, Human Need. 93 Bradburn, Psychological Well-Being; Diener and Emmons, "Positive Affect". 94 Campbell et al, Quality, fig. 2 -5, p. 52-53; Blanchflower and Oswald, p. 20. scarcity could be a problem in the future as much as in the past. In other words, that the determinants of welfare are historically contingent. How contingent? this is one of the challenges for economics and history in the twenty-first century.
